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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1948-1949*
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS

D ECISIONS

of moment in the law of corporations, while not
monumental in character, have produced interesting sidelights upon corporate activity as well as on the rights and obligations of shareholders. A growing pressure to eliminate, or at least
to severely restrict, the immunity granted eleemosynary corporations from tort liability for the acts of their agents' has already
been noted. 2 A new case from the Second District, that of Moore
v. Moyle,3 relying heavily on the decision in Piper v. Epstein,4 has
reverted to first principles, leading to the dismissal of the action
as it affected the charitable corporation. There can be little, if
any, justification for an immunity not granted to other types of
* The present survey is not intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past year,
but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases and
developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that of the
judicial year, embracing from 400 Ill. 347 to 403 Ill. 395; from 335 Ill. App. 1 to
338 Ill. App. 20. Statutory changes having general interest are also included.
1 Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
556 (1905).
2 See notes in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 256, 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

279, 36 Ill. B. J. 488, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 248, 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 173. In Wendt v.
Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947), no suggestion was
made that there should be a complete elimination of the immunity, but it was
there restricted to such eleemosynary corporations as did not carry public liability
insurance from which tort liability, might be collected without impairing the trust
funds.
3335 Ill. App. 342, 82 N. E. (2d) 61 (1948).
A certificate of importance was
issued therein. The case, at the present writing, still remains pending in the
Illinois Supreme Court.
4 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945). The decision therein was criticized
in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 266.
1
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associations, so the result seems unfortunate, particularly where,
as in that case, the charity has seen fit to insure against the risk
involved. Does it not also become apparent that the insured corporation has itself impaired its "trust fund," at least to the extent
of paying premiums for which there can be no hope of return?'
The opinion in the Moore case made no mention of the holding
6
by the First District in the case of Wendt v. Servite Fathers,
but the conflict between the two cases is such that only a decision
by the Illinois Supreme Court can resolve the problem.7
The litigation in Western Foundry Company v. Wicker" arose
out of an attempt by the corporation to relieve itself of an intolerable burden of unearned and undeclared cumulative dividends
due its preferred shareholders. The board of directors proposed
a plan to the shareholders whereby the corporate charter would
be amended so as to constitute a waiver and release of such dividends by the preferred shareholders, but without change in the
capital structure as it concerned such shareholders and for no
other consideration than a resumption of dividend payments with
respect to the future. Some ninety-seven per cent of the shareholders approved of the plan at a special meeting; but the particular defendant objected and demanded payment of such past
due dividends on his preferred stock. The corporation sought a
declaratory judgment establishing the validity of the amendment
so ratified. Although the statute applicable was the 1919 General
Corporation Act,9 now repealed by the present Business Corporation Act, the problem involved could well arise today. The First
District Appellate Court had been of the opinion that the statutory provisions regarding charter amendment could not be con5 It can only be supposed that the reason for the taking out of public liability is
for the purpose of offering members of the public some source of restitution for
injury done. If it is done merely to obtain a defense staff, whose sole function will
be to move for dismissal of any action arising out of such injury, the issue closely
approaches one of unauthorized practice of law by insurance companies.
6 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947).
7 It is understood that the Supreme Court, not in the period of this survey,
handed down an interim opinion affirming the decision in Moore v. Moyle: see 38
Ill. B. J. 68, noting action in case No. 30957. Publication of the opinion has been
withheld to date, pending a rehearing.
8403 Ill. 260, 85 N. E. (2d) 722 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
159, reversing 335 Ill. App. 106, 80 N. E. (2d) 548 (1948).
9 Laws 1919, p. 328, § 59.
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strued to allow a change which operated retroactively on a contractual right. The Supreme Court, in reversing and declaring
the amendment valid, regarded the right of the prescribed
majority, voting by classes, to alter "rights and preferences"
of preferred shares, as broad enough to include the right to cancel
accrued, but undeclared, dividends. The court chose to find that
such action did not have retroactive effect as the amendment was
said to affect only undeclared dividends, a matter which was contractual in nature and not one concerning a "vested property
interest." When so viewed, the decision is eminently sound but
the result can scarcely be said to be palatable to preferred shareholders and would tend to confirm the somewhat cynical attitude
which has been expressed toward such stock. 10
A case of interest because of the comparison it provides is that
of Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Company," where certain
minority shareholders were also seeking relief against the corporation. Plaintiffs there held stock which was preferred to the
extent of par in the event of liquidation and was cumulatively
preferred as to dividends. The corporation, seeking to liquidate
by sale of all of its assets, proposed a plan of distribution at a
special shareholders' meeting, at which time both the proposed
sale and plan were approved by majority vote. The plan contemplated a distribution of par plus a small portion of the accumulated dividends on the preferred shares and a small sum to the
common shares. The court therein, citing the cases which had
been rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court in the Western
Foundry Company case, 1 2 held that the common shareholders
had no right to impair those "antecedently vested rights" of the
preferred shareholders.' 3
10 See Spoerri, "What Goes in the Stock Clauses?", 37 Ill. B. J. 422 (1949).
11335 Ill. App. 402, 84 N. E. (2d) 184 (1948), noted in 27 CHIOAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 178, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1010. So much of the decision as affects this problem
Is probably dicta since the case was brought up on a motion to dismiss the complaint. It is apparent, on first reading, that had the case been appealed on the
basis of a judgment on the merits the same decision would have been reached.
12Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Chan. 391, 190 A. 115 (1936); Consolidated
Film Industries v. Johnson, 22 Del. Chan. 407, 197 A. 489 (1937) ; Davison v. Parke,
Austin & Lipscomb, 285 N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. (2d) 618 (1941).
13 As the holding therein was announced on October 29, 1948, and the decision
in the Western Foundry Company case did not come until March 24, 1949, the
Appellate Court is chargeable only with a lack of clairvoyance, not of negligence.
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Another example of a shareholder attempting to preserve intact
his interest in his corporation appears in Oppenheimer v. Wm. F.
Chiniquy Company.1 4 The corporation there concerned offered its
present shareholders the privilege of purchasing a pro-rata share
of its treasury stock. Plaintiff wrote his acceptance of the offer
within the time specified but did not tender payment until some
time after the period had run. When the corporation refused to
issue new shares to the plaintiff and attempted to issue the stock
to third persons, plaintiff sued to enjoin that action. The court
felt that, as the corporation had failed to specify a time for pay15
ment, plaintiff should prevail upon his tender of payment.
Several cases deciding procedural questions affecting corporate
activities merit at least passing mention. The real essence of the
problem in Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Company16 was one
of election of remedies. The cause of action was brought in chancery to impress a trust for the benefit of shareholders. It was
asserted that the complaint should be stricken as the plaintiffs
were precluded from relief for failure to file a statutory action
based on Section 73 of the Business Corporation Act. 17. The
Appellate Court held that, in cases involving fraud or illegality, 8
the remedy provided by Section 73 was not exclusive, a decision
which will have salutary effect as it grants greater flexibility in
instances where the shareholder, objecting to a sale of corporate
assets, may have failed to take all appropriate steps under the
Il1. App. 190, 81 N. E. (2d) 260 (1948). Leave to appeal has been denied.
The decision cites no Illinois case in point and is composed principally of an
extended quotation from Sommer v. Armour Gas & Oil Co., 71 Misc. 211, 128
N. Y. S. 382 (1911).
16335 Il1. App. 402, 82 N. E. (2d) 184 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REv Ew 178, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1010. In Roddy v. Armitage-Hamlin Corporation, 401
Ill. 605, 83 N. E. (2d) 308 (1949), reversing the holding of the Appellate Court for
the First District which had dismissed the appeal taken therein, the Supreme Court
decided that a suit based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.73, brought by
minority stockholders for non-submission to them of a proposal to lease the principal corporate asset, stated a separate cause from one brought, in a representative
capacity, for alleged fraud on the part of the corporate directors, hence a decree
dismissing the first claim constituted a "final" order within the meaning of Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201, even though the trial court retained jurisdiction of the claim based on fraud.
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.73.
18 The ruling being made on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's allegation of
fraud was presumed to be true for purpose of achieving a decision. The case was
not heard on the merits.
14335
15

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1948-1949

statute but might still be able to rely on the fraud to support his
action.
Section 42 of the Business Corporation Act purports to impose
personal liability on a director who votes to authorize a dividend
payment while the corporation is insolvent.' 9 A suit against the
estate of a deceased director who was alleged, while living, to have
authorized such an unlawful dividend, was met by the defense that
the cause of action did not survive. Section 339 of the Illinois
Probate Act, however, provides that, where fraud is the issue, a
cause of action will survive. 20 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in Aiken v. Peabody,21 construed the declaration
of dividends by an Illinois corporation at a time when the corporation was insolvent to be a constructive fraud on its creditors,
and also held that an intent to defraud need not be shown. Such
being the case, the estate of the deceased corporate director was
held liable to answer under the circumstances therein disclosed.
An interesting analogy appears in Gargac v. Smith-Rowland
Company22 where the issue was one as to the survival of a cause
of action against a dissolved corporation. The foreign corporation there concerned withdrew from Illinois, where it had been
doing business, in order to dissolve in its domiciliary state. The
suit was based on a cause of action which had arisen while the
corporation was doing business in Illinois, but was not filed until
some three years after such corporation had withdrawn. The defendant corporation suggested that the two-year period of limitation fixed by Section 94 of the Business Corporation Act 23 was
applicable both to foreign and domestic corporations which had
been dissolved. The court, however, thought that, as the withdrawal came under Section 120, which was silent as to a period
of limitation, any determination had to be based on general public
policy. It decided that the limitation period applicable would be
the one fixed by the sovereignty creating the corporation. It
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.42.
20 Ibid., Ch. 3, § 494.

21168 F. (2d) 615 (1947).
22170 F. (2d) 177 (1948).
23 I1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.94
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seemed to think that the authority, if any, for suing a dissolved
corporation, somewhat like that applicable to a decedent, was to be
ascertained from reference to the law of its domicile.
Irregularities in proceedings to dissolve domestic corporations for failure to file annual reports and make payment of
franchise taxes 24 are not infrequent although perhaps excusable
by reason of the volume of such litigation. The case of Parsons
v. Lurie,2 5 therefore, possesses some significance for it was there
decided that jurisdictional requirements would be presumed to
have been met, even though the publication notice appeared to
have been given prior to the time when return of "not found"
was made on the summons, 26 at least in collateral proceedings
brought by third persons. Direct attack on the judgment of dissolution, made by the corporation itself, might have led to a different result.
While not truly a case involving corporation law, the Illinois attorney should give more than a passing thought to the
holding in Plast v. Metropolitan Trust Company.27 The court
there faced the problem of construing a provision in a liquidating trust agreement to the effect that the trust was to terminate
within ten years from and after its date. The trustees proposed
to exchange the trust certificates for shares in a new corporation which was to be formed to manage the trust property. The
shares so obtained were then to be exchanged for beneficial certificates in a voting trust to be created to maintain control of
the corporation. A majority of the beneficiaries in the liquidating trust approved of the .transaction, but a minority holder questioned its validity. The court, recognizing that Olsen v. Rossetter2 was a controlling precedent forbidding trustees from
using their powers of amendment to authorize an extension in
the duration of the trust, nevertheless held that the proposed exchange was a "sale" within the terms of the trust instrument,
24 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.82.

25400
26 Ill.
27 401
28 399

Ill. 498, 81 N. E. (2d) 182 (1948).
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.84.
Ill. 302, 82 N. E. (2d) 155 (1948).
Ill. 232, 77 N. E. (2d) 652 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 7.
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thereby terminating the trust in ample time. If the same thought
be applicable to a voting trust, the duration of which is fixed
by statute, the conclusion reached would be interesting to say the
least.
Still another case, although its effect lies principally in another field, should be noted here. In Indenity Insurance Company of North America v. Prairie State Bank,29 the indemnitor
of an issuing corporation sued a transfer agent who had guaranteed the signature on certain shares in a transfer transaction.
The shareholder, alleging a forgery, had sued the issuing corporation and the present plaintiffs, as indemnitors, had defended
and lost in the lower court. On appeal from that judgment, the
present defendants joined the defense and the appeal was successful. The present plaintiffs then sought indemnity for the
expenses incurred in that suit. It was held that a transfer agent's
guarantee of the genuineness of a signature was neither a general guarantee nor an insurance contract to cover all damages
but was, more nearly, restricted to cover liability arising in the
event the signature at issue was not genuine. As a consequence,
the particular signature having been shown to be genuine, the
defendants were not liable for the incidental damage which had
arisen from a collateral cause.
Several changes in the Business Corporation Act were made
at the recent session of the General Assembly. While most were
designed to clarify certain provisions, some warrant attention.
The definition of paid-in surplus has been modified to allow a
deduction for expenses, including commissions, incurred by the
corporation in the issuance of shares which do not constitute
stated capital.30 Corporations are now able to make donations
in time of peace, whether for the public welfare or for charitable,
scientific, religious or educational purposesA1 A corporation must
not commence business until $1000 has been paid in as considera29 336 Ill. App. 438, 84 N. E. (2d) 338 (1949). Leave to appeal has been denied.
30 Laws 1949, p. 605 et seq., H. B. 652. As the measure made changes in a number
of sections of the Business Corporation Act, one blanket reference is made thereto
at this point. The particular sections amended are set forth in notes 30 to 40
inclusive, post. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.2(1) and § 157.19(c).
31 I1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.5(m).
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tion for the issuance of shares,8 2 a statement to that effect must
appear in the articles of incorporation,83 and the liability of directors for commencing business prior thereto is both predicated
on and limited to such amount. 4 If all the corporate property
and business is confined to Illinois, and the incorporators elect
to pay their franchise tax on the basis of the entire stated capital
and paid-in surplus, the usual estimates regarding property and
potential business to be done in Illinois need not be put in the
articles of incorporation.35 It is now permissible to change the
statement in the articles of incorporation regarding the number
and class of shares a corporation proposes to issue without making a report to the Secretary of State.3
The board of directors is also given greater latitude in connection with a reduction
of paid-in surplus, 37 but such reduction may not bring the sum
of the stated capital and paid-in surplus below the $1000 minimum capital requirement. Actions brought by dissenting shareholders for relief in case of a proposed merger, consolidation, or
sale of assets will now be governed by the practice and procedural sections of the Civil Practice Act.38 The penalties imposed under Section 100 of the Business Corporation Act, as it
40
relates to corporations, 9 and by Section 101 as to directors,
are now made equally applicable to domestic and foreign corporations. Some of the Business Corporation Act provisions
have also been made applicable to domestic railroad corporations.
41
In addition, a number of former statutes were repealed.

32 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.50.

33 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.47 (n).
34 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.42(e).
35Ibid., Ch. 32, §§157.47(m), 157.96a, 157.97(k), 157.117(k), 157.128(b)(3),
157.131(b) (3), 157.132.
36 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.57.
37 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.60a.
38 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.70 and § 157.73.
39 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.100.
40 Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.101.
41 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, §§ 210, 348.60, 375-7, 378-86, 390-2, 398,
441, 470, 219, 223, 231(1), 241a, 520, 522, 554, 564, 567, 570 and 587, repealed by
House Bills numbered 653, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 707, Senate Bills 531 and 549,
and House Bills 660, 932, and 701 respectively.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT

The problem of the "middleman" or go-between relationship
came before the Illinois Appellate Court in the case of Whiston
v. David Mayer Building Corporation,42 wherein the plaintiff,
a real estate broker, had been requested by an airline corporation to secure suitable office space for it. In the course of his
attempts to carry out such assignment, the plaintiff talked by
telephone with the leasing officer of the defendant, indicating a
desire to represent the building corporation in a proposed lease
of space to a client. The defendant's officer inquired for and was
given the name of the client. A conference between the parties
was arranged but no agreement was then reached. A lease was
later entered into by the interested parties, albeit without the
knowledge of, or further service on the part of, plaintiff. In a
suit to recover one-half of the customary brokerage commission,
plaintiff based his claim upon the contention that, by requesting
to be permitted to act as broker and by the consent of defendant's officer to see the prospective lessee, an implied contract
was entered into authorizing plaintiff to procure a tenant. A
judgment in plaintiff's favor was reversed when the Appellate Court declared that plaintiff was not a middleman. It said
that middlemen situations are "exceptional and their character
should appear clearly . . . The theory of the middleman relationship is that the 'go-between' has nothing to do with negotiations and consequently it is of no importance that both parties may pay him. ' 43 The granting of permission for an informal exploratory conference, however, was held not to be an
assent to any proposed brokerage deal, hence plaintiff was not
entitled to any fee.
The attorney-client relationship occupies a special place in
the law of agency, one enhanced by a quite natural desire on
the part of members of the legal profession to examine carefully all decisions which might vitally affect them. In Price
42337 Ill. App. 67, 84 N. E. (2d) 858 (1949). Leave to appeal has been denied.
43 337 Il1. App. 67 at 71, 84 N. E. (2d) 858 at 860.
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v. Seator, 44 the Appellate Court reiterated, in connection with a
trial court's failure to permit a substitution of attorneys as requested by a client, the well-established principle that a litigant
has the unquestioned right to discharge his attorney at any
time, with or without cause, subject only to his obligation to
compensate the attorney without fault for services theretofore
rendered, either on a quantum meruit basis or according to any
express contract existing between the parties. It took occasion therein to emphasize that "as a matter of simple justice,
no attorney, whose continuation as such is objected to by the
client, should presume to render additional services without express authorization of the client, and if the attorney does render
'4 5
such service he should be denied compensation."
In Joslyn v. Joslyn,46 however, the court was confronted with
an unusual situation in which the attorney had taken an assignment of his client's claim for alimony arising out of a divorce
proceeding. That fact was brought to the attention of the court
when proceedings were had, on a petition by the wife's former
attorney, to secure an allowance for fees and expenses. The
petition was presented after entry of a consent decree which reserved jurisdiction on the point. The Appellate Court, reversing an order which had awarded fees to the attorney, found that,
by reason of the assignment, the attorney was the real party
in interest and, because he had carried on "a flood of litigation" throughout a period of eight years, was guilty of having
unclean hands, a factor which required that his claim should be
denied.
There is no doubt that great care should be exercised by
attorneys when drafting and filing notices of attorney's lien for
the statute creating such lien was unknown to the common law
and must, therefore, be strictly construed. That statute provides
that service of notice of attorney's lien may "be made by registered mail, upon the party against whom their clients may have
44 337 Ill. App. 248, 85 N. E. (2d) 848 (1949). Leave to appeal has been denied.
45 337 Ill. App. 248 at 258, 85 N. E. (2d) 848 at 853.
46 337 11. App. 443, 86 N. E. (2d) 367 (1949). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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such suits, claims or causes of action." '4 7 In DeParcq v. Gardner,4 the attorney who had been retained to recover damages
on a claim for personal injuries filed notice of his attorney's
lien upon the railroad company despite the fact that it had been
dissolved and the defendant had been appointed trustee of its
properties prior to the making of the contract between the attorney and his client. The contract only mentioned a claim against
the railroad company, not one against the trustee. In addition,
the notice was not mailed to the trustee's only office, located at
an address different from the one to which the notice was sent.
The faulty contract and equally faulty service were held to be
more than mere technical error or misnomer, being rather a
case of mistaken identity, hence the notice of lien was regarded
ineffective to preserve the attorney's lien for his fees.
Persons acting in the capacity of brokers or agents should
take notice of the decision in Mickelson v. Kolb,4 9 for many such
parties operate under trade names. The plaintiff there, a licensed
real estate broker doing business under a trade name which had
not been registered at the time in the fashion required by the
"assumed name" statute, 50 was employed to sell defendant's
property. When plaintiff found it necessary to sue the defendant to recover brokerage commissions earned, the court dismissed
the action, and the Appellate Court affirmed the holding, because of an alleged public policy that non-compliance with the
"assumed name" statute should exclude the broker from collecting his pay. The forfeiture of the right to recover was said
to be required by the fact that the statute made it unlawful to
do business without first registering the assumed name. That
holding was not commanded by the statute, for it says nothing
as to the validity of contracts made by persons affected thereby.
The decision is even more unfortunate as it represents a view
once adhered to elsewhere but from which other courts and legisIll.
48 336
49 337
REww
50 Ill.
47

Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, § 14.
Ill. App. 144, 83 N. E. (2d) 32 (1948).
I1. App. 493, 86 N. E. (2d) 152 (1949), noted in 27
327.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 96, § 4 et seq.
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latures have long since retreated. 5 1 The court also held that
the co-plaintiff, a licensed broker but one operating under his
own name, who had been simultaneously engaged by the defendant, could not recover because the intrinsic invalidity affected
the whole contract.
IJABOR LAW

A problem calling for interpretation of a provision of the

Illinois Child Labor Act 5 2 came before the Supreme Court in
the case of Gorczyn.ski v. Nugent.53 The plaintiff therein, a boy
thirteen years of age, had been employed by the owner of race
horses to walk the animals after exercise periods or races under an arrangement calling for regular hours and fixed wages.
The race horses in question were kept, pursuant to board rule,
in a stable area owned by the race track corporation and policed by it, to which only licensed persons were supposed to
have access. The plaintiff was not listed as an employee but,
while present on the premises performing his daily chores, was
severely injured by one of the horses. His suit, based on the
Child Labor Act, was directed against the race horse owner who
had employed him and also against the race track corporation.
The principal question presented on an appeal from a judgment
against the race track corporation was whether it had "permitted or suffered" the plaintiff to work on its premises. The
court, passing upon defendant's contention that the words "permit or suffer" implied effective control, actual knowledge, and
conscious consent, alleged to be lacking in the instant case, declared that the relation of master and servant was not necessary to establish liability and that the corporation was under a
positive duty to investigate and supervise all persons present in
attendance upon the horses. As supervisory control had been
vested by the corporation in a board of stewards who could have
effectively prevented the violation, the defendant corporation
51 See 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvmw 327 at 332-4.

52 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 31.1 et seq.
53 402 Ill. 147, 83 N. E. (2d) 495 (1949), affirming 335 I1. App. 63, 80 N. E. (2d)
418 (1948).
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was held to have "permitted or suffered" plaintiff to work in
5 4
violation of the statute.
Another child labor case, that of Hylak v. Marcal, Inc.,55
concerned a fifteen-year old girl, injured while operating a punch
press, who had falsified her age at the time of her employment.
The girl, through a next friend, filed suit for the recovery of
damages, basing her claim upon an alleged violation of former
Section 18 of the Child Labor Act, then in force. 56 That statute
made it the duty of the defendant, if it employed minors over
fourteen and under sixteen years of age, to keep a register in
the factory listing the names, ages, and residences of all employed minors, and to procure and place on file an employment
certificate issued by the Superintendent of Schools. The defendant did not keep any such register or procure any such certificate
as its policy had been not to employ minors. The Appellate
Court, sustaining a judgment in favor of plaintiff, quoted from
the opinion in Gill v. Boston Store of Chicago5 7 to the effect that
the prohibition of employment of all children under sixteen
years of age is absolute in the absence of an employment certificate, as a consequence of which all other evidence became immaterial. Compliance with the statute was considered to be the
only possible justification available to the employer.
Several amendments to existing statutes, dealing with incidents of the employer-employee relationship, were enacted at the
recent session of the General Assembly. Thus the Act of July
9, 1937, which fixes the time for the payment of wages due employees and provides for enforcement by the Department of Labor, 58 was amended to include within its purview all wage pay54 A subsidiary issue was made over the point as to whether or not plaintiff's
employment was not "in connection with any place of amusement," inasmuch as the
service was not performed in the area of the race track itself. The court pointed
out that a single fence enclosed the entire race track property, including the stable
area, and the work done by the plaintiff was essential if races were to be carried on
within the enclosure. A reasonable connection between the operation of the race
track as a place of amusement and the work performed by plaintiff in the adjacent
stable area was said to be found present.
55 335 Ill. App. 48, 80 N. E. (2d) 411 (1948). Leave to appeal has been denied.
56 Section 18 of the former law is substantially the same as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 31.6.
57 337 Ill. 70, 168 N. E. 895 (1929).
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 39g et seq.
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ments not exceeding the amount of $150 instead of the limit of
$100 previously controlling. 0 An increase in benefit payments
under the Unemployment Compensation Act from $20 to $25 per
week may be noted.60 The standard of "availability" for work,
a prerequisite for eligibility to receive benefits, has been modified
in three respects. First, a person shall be deemed unavailable
for work if, after his separation from his most recent job, he
has moved to a locality where opportunities for work are substantially less favorable than those in the locality he has left.
Second, a woman is to be considered unavailable for work if she
has left her most recent job voluntarily because of pregnancy,
but the period of unavailability is limited to the thirteen weeks
immediately preceding the anticipated date of childbirth and the
four weeks which immediately follow such event. Third, a person is to be deemed unavailable for work (a) if he has left his
employment to marry, except where he has become the sole support of himself and his family, or (b) if he has left such employment because of marital, filial, or other domestic circumstance,
so long as such circumstance continues. 6 1
By another amendment, a person is declared to be ineligible
for benefits if he is discharged because of the commission of a
felony in connection with his work, for which the employer is
in no way responsible. The ineligibility is to occur only if the
employer notifies the Director of such event within specified time
limits, and then only if (a) the employee has admitted the felony
to a representative of the Director, or (b) has been convicted
thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction. If the employee,
by reason of such crime, is in legal custody, the determination
of his benefit rights is to be held in abeyance pending the re62
sult of any legal proceedings arising therefrom.
The provisions dealing with the enforcement of claims against
an employer for contributions toward unemployment compensation payments have been amended so as to provide that, when59 Laws
60 Laws
61 Ibid.,
62 Ibid.,

1949, p. 882, H. B. 991; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 39h.
1949, p. 887, H. B. 1105; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 220.
Ch. 48, § 222.
Ch. 48, § 223.
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ever an execution or writ of attachment is levied upon any personal property claimed by any person other than the defendant
or is claimed to be exempt, the person making such claim must
give written notice thereof within ten days of the making of
the levy. If such written notice is not given, the claimant is
to be forever barred from bringing action against the sheriff for
63
injury to or conversion of the property involved.
WORKMEN) S COMPENSATION

While voting for an increase in payments under the Unemployment Compensation Act, the legislature also saw fit to increase benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation
Act 64 and the Occupational Diseases Act6 5 by a flat fifteen per
cent. This increase is the second in a three-year period, for
prior increases had been granted by the legislature in 1947.
The amended statutes will necessarily be consulted by those
whose interests are directly affected.
One novel question for judicial consideration was raised in
Victor v. Dehmlow, 66 wherein the Appellate Court stated that
a minor who worked for his father under an "implied" contract for hire could be considered an "employee" of his father
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, nothwithstanding that
he was not carried on his father's payroll as an employee, was
not paid any wages, and was being supported by his father. The
decision came in connection with a common law suit brought by
the widow of one who was under the Workmen's Compensation
Act against the father of the minor and was based on the premise that if the legislature had intended to exclude minors employed by their parents from the operation of the statute it
would have made provision for their exclusion.67 the broader
implication of the decision lies in the fact that it may support
63 Laws 1949, p. 884, S. B. 202; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 243(c).
64 Laws 1949, p. 905, H. B. 1061; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 144.
65 Laws 1949, p. 869, H. B. 1062; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §172.7.
66336 Ill. App. 432, 84 N. E. (2d) 342 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REViEw 257. Leave to appeal has been granted.
67 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 147(f).
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the holding that a minor, doing some work for a parent who is
under the act, may be able to claim compensation from his parent for fairly unsubstantial services although he normally would
not be permitted to sue for payment for such services or for
harm arising therefrom, even if the services were substantial in
68
nature.
II. CONTRACTS
While there has been the customary dearth of cases dealing with general contract doctrines, the same thing cannot be
said of certain of the specialized segments of contract law hereinafter mentioned, which segments have been treated separately
for the benefit of those practicing therein.
INSURANCE,

It could be expected that a host of claims of variable description would follow in the wake of the disastrous fire which
swept through the LaSalle Hotel early one morning in 1946.
Many of these claims have been settled, but one culminated in
the case of Denham v. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Company.1 The
plaintiff-insurer therein sought a declaratory judgment freeing
it from liability in excess of $10,000 under an insurance policy
whereby it had agreed to pay, on behalf of the insured and subject to definite limits of liability, all sums which the insured
should become "legally obligated to pay to any person or persons by reason of liability for damage to or loss of property of
any guest or invitee while said property" was in the custody
or control of the assured or on the premises. The maximum
limit of liability for any one occurrence or catastrophe was set
at $10,000 with the further proviso that any payment made
should automatically reduce the insurer's liability pro tanto, except as the contract might be reinstated under condition "H"
of the policy. That clause directed that the policy should be
"immediately reinstated as respects any subsequent loss, to ap68 See 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Ravriw 257 at 258, and Wilhelm v. Industrial Commission, 399 Ill.
80, 77 N. E. (2d) 174 (1948), on the related problem of the possibility of compensation between husband and wife.
1168 F. (2d) 576 (1948).

